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I.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2011, a twelve-year-old middle school student in Minnesota was
disciplined due to three postings on her Facebook wall.1 In the first posting, the
student expressed her dislike for an employee at the middle school;2 in the second, the student expressed her interest in discovering the identity of the person
who “told on her” for writing the first posting; in the third, the student engaged
in a conversation with a male student about “sexual topics”.3 The student made
each Facebook posting outside of school hours and from her home.4 School
officials confirmed this information in a disturbing manner by threatening the
student with disciplinary action unless she provided them with her usernames
and passwords for her email and Facebook accounts.5
“Forced Consent” 6 social media policies of schools and universities
‡
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1
R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1132–33 (D. Minn. 2012).
2
Id. at 1133.
3
Id. at 1133-34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (More specifically, the student
wrote, “I want to know who the f&$# [sic] told on me.”).
4
Id. at 1133.
5
Id. at 1133-34 (School officials initially received the information regarding the first
two posts from a tip. Then, school officials learned of the third posting from the guardian of
the male student engaged in the online conversation with R.S. and subsequently confirmed
the information by demanding the student’s Facebook password.).
6
“Forced Consent,” as used in this Comment, originates from an article discussing
how the California Supreme Court’s review of a lower court forced a juror to consent to
allowing his Facebook postings to be disclosed to the parties to the case. See Cindy Cohn &
John Eisenberg, EFF Asks Supreme Court to Reverse “Forced Consent” to Facebook Dis-
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have required students to give officials access to students’ personal social media accounts.7 In some instances, school officials require students to obey a
school administrator’s demand for access to social media accounts to investigate an allegation of misconduct.8 In other instances, application of these policies is not triggered by actual misconduct, but by the school’s eagerness to
maintain a positive reputation regarding the character and conduct of its students. 9 Secondary and postsecondary educational institutions’ use of these
practices raises significant legal questions, 10 as the practices conflict with a
person’s fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression.11 Privacy
rights trace their roots to the common law principle “that the individual shall
have full protection in person and in property.”12 Over time, the scope of this
principle broadened, developing into the right to be left alone, and the term
“property” grew to comprise both tangible and intangible forms of possesclosure, EFF (Jul. 31, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1bTfSYH. According to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, consent under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence must be voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973). Thus, consent is involuntary when it the product of “duress or coercion, expressed
or implied.” Id.; see, e.g., Lysander Spooner, Forced Consent (1873) (discussing the problems of an American government that forces its citizens to support it, rather than to do so
voluntarily) (“The idea that, although government should rest on the consent of the governed, yet so much force may nevertheless be employed as may be necessary to produce that
consent, embodies everything that was ever exhibited in the shape of usurpation and tyranny
in any country on earth.”).
7
See also David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing
Students’, Workers’ Social Media, A.B.A. J. 22 (Nov. 2012) (noting that both schools and
“[m]any universities require students to let officials access their social media, and in some
cases impel students to install spying software. Some colleges force their student-athletes to
consent to the monitoring of their” social media accounts); see, e.g., Minnewaska Area Sch.
Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (discussing how school officials forced a student to
log-in to her social media account so they could monitor the account).
8
Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. Indeed, this was the case with the twelve-year-old
student, where school officials sought her username and password after the officials learned
of her Facebook posts. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
9
See Kellie Woodhouse, University of Michigan Athletes Sign Social Media Policy in
Bid to Avoid Controversy As Twitter Incidents Multiply, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS (Oct. 29,
2012, 5:47 AM), http://commcns.org/1gFcCYA (discussing comments from University of
Michigan’s football coach on how the school wants its players to represent the program);
see also Bob Sullivan, Govt. Agencies, Colleges Demand Applicants’ Facebook Passwords,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1fA5JVf (observing that colleges have begun to request applicants’ social media log-in information during interviews).
10 See Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (“There are multiple incidents around the country
where schools are invading the social media privacy rights of K-12 students.”).
11 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1985) (holding that students have the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) (recognizing students’ fundamental right to
freedom of expression).
12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
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sion.13 Arguably, a person’s privacy rights now encompass his or her right to
control access to personal social media accounts.14 Notably, a person’s right of
free expression originates from the United States Constitution and has developed to “allow free trade in ideas.”15
In today’s society, social media plays an integral role in our everyday
lives—from emails between friends to social network postings that detail the
activities of someone’s day.16 A few types of social networks that are popular
among students, both in secondary and postsecondary education, are Facebook,17 Twitter,18 and Instagram. 19 Social network sites have privacy policies
and terms and conditions for users, giving them the “the ability to control how
their information is shared.”20 However, the degree of privacy each of these
social networks recognizes varies depending on the networks’ privacy policies.21
In general, courts will uphold “forced consent” policies over the student’s
reasonable expectation of privacy when the school’s teachers and administrators have a substantial interest “in maintaining discipline in the classroom and
on school grounds.”22 Supporters of forced consent policies argue that the policies help monitor criminal and other types of conduct that negatively reflect
the educational institution.23 On the other hand, opponents of these administrative practices argue that these policies violate students’ privacy rights.24 These
13

Id.
Connie Davis Powell, Privacy for Social Networking, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 689, 692 (2012).
15 Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 1017
(2008) (internal quotations omitted).
16 Nir Orr, Modern Social Media and Information Transmission Problems, IHLS (Dec.
23, 2012), http://commcns.org/1dXfNmh (“Today’s social media has become the playground of nearly every person in the world.”).
17 See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA AND MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG
TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 3 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
http://commcns.org/MpCF83.
18 Jim Edwards, Facebook is No Longer the Most Popular Social Network For Teens,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://commcns.org/1n6G5Z2.
19 See MAEVE DUGGAN & JOANNA BRENNER, THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
USERS—2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 6 (Feb. 14, 2013), available at
http://commcns.org/1bTgAoO.
20 Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get over It!” Would Warren
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 165 (2011).
21 Powell, supra note 20, at 165–67.
22 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1143 (D. Minn. 2012) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 Ian Hanner, Universities Force Student-Athletes to Reveal Their Facebook Passwords, THE COLLEGE FIX (Mar. 29, 2012), http://commcns.org/1eLlaGd.
24 Scott G. McNealy, What Are Privacy Interests? You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get
over It, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 10:5, at 361 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed., 2012) (discussing
14
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“forced consent” policies have been challenged as unreasonable searches that
infringe upon a student’s freedom of expression, in violation of the First and
Fourth Amendments.25
This Comment argues that social media policies in secondary and postsecondary schools that allow school officials to request or demand students to
consent to their social media accounts being accessed or monitored violate the
First and Fourth Amendments.26 This Comment also argues that state legislatures in California and Delaware should enact statutes that would ban social
media policies in educational institutions that force students to consent to disclosing social network account information.27 Furthermore, this Comment argues that judicial review is necessary to determine the constitutionality of these
social media policies.28
Part II focuses on the origins of a person’s right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment and how its interpretation has developed from English common
law into the modern view. In addition, Part II will focus on the First Amendment’s freedom of expression history. Part III briefly examines various forms
of social networks that are popular amongst students in secondary and postsecondary educational institutions. Part III also examines how these social networks recognize the rights of users in keeping personal information from being
involuntarily disclosed to third parties. Part IV of this Comment explores the
different types of social media policies forcing students to disclose social network account information that have been reported in secondary and postsecondary schools. Part IV also discusses the consequences of students’ failure to
consent to these policies. Part V investigates the modern views from supporters
and opponents of social media policies. Part VI discusses how policies that
force students to consent to monitoring of their social media accounts are
flawed. Part VII suggests that state legislators should enact and amend statutes
the societal values surrounding privacy rights, as well as the work of privacy advocates);
Hanner, supra note 23.
25 Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (“Plaintiffs argue that
the punishment of [the student’s] out-of-school wall postings violated her First Amendment
right to free speech . . . [and that] the officials’ . . . search of [the student’s] private Facebook account constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.”). Pertinently,
the First Amendment to the Constitution holds that, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourth Amendment states, in
pertinent part, that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
These Amendments apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 1.
26 See discussion infra Part VI.
27 See discussion infra Part VII; see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; Dina Abou
Salem, California First to Endorse Comprehensive Social Media Privacy Law, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 27, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://commcns.org/LFzKIv.
28 See discussion infra Part VII.
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to prohibit the monitoring of students by these means. In addition, Part VII
suggests that the judicial system should determine whether these forced consent policies are constitutional. Part VIII discusses the importance of uniform
legislation and how the proposed amendment to current privacy statutes will
provide students with broader protection.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

It is important to discuss how the rights to privacy and freedom of expression have developed before analyzing the use of forced consent policies in educational institutions under the First and Fourth Amendments. Although the
breadth of a person’s rights to privacy and free expression have expanded over
time, both rights trace their roots back to common law principles.29
A. Right to Privacy under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches . . .
shall not be violated.”30 One of the key purposes of the Amendment is to protect the privacy of an individual. 31 The right to privacy originates from the
common law principle “that the individual shall have full protection in person
and in property.”32 However, scholars have taken note of the necessity to redefine the extent of such protection to meet developing changes in society.33
In his concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan articulated a twopronged test in determining whether a person is protected under the Fourth
Amendments from unreasonable searches: (1) that a person has a subjective
expectation of privacy; and (2) that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’34 In United States v. Jones, the Supreme
29 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 198 (“The common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.”); Jay, supra note 15, at 783 (“Comparing the
current body of First Amendment law, there is a radical difference in outlook regarding
freedom of expression between the eighteenth and the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.”).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 31213 (2010).
32 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193.
33 Powell, supra note 14, at 690; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193 (Warren and
Brandeis recognized that “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”).
34 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Court reaffirmed a statement by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Katz: a search is a government intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy for the purpose of obtaining
information.35 Moreover, the Court held that trespass alone does not equal a
search, but it must be conjoined with an attempt to find or to obtain something.36
Furthermore, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149,
the district court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in New Jersey v.
T.L.O. as establishing that students “enjoy a Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials.”37 In T.L.O.,
an assistant vice principal demanded that a student hand her purse to him, after
that student had denied smoking in a school restroom.38 Next, the administrator
reached into the purse for the cigarettes, noticed rolling papers—which he associated with marijuana use—and, as a result, conducted a thorough search of
the purse, revealing drug-related paraphernalia and marijuana.39 Although the
Court found that the search of the student’s purse for cigarettes by school officials was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,40 the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions extend to searches conducted by
public school officials.41 Further, the T.L.O. Court recognized that a “search of
a child’s person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person . . . is
undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy,” and the
court was willing to recognize such expectations as reasonable.42
B. Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”43 At the time of
the First Amendment’s enactment, America’s legal tradition “was not generous
toward the rights of speakers . . . especially not if their words were critical of
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
Id. at 951 n.5. It should also be noted that, “situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at
953.
37 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1141 (D. Minn. 2012).
38 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 346–47.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 337–39. The T.L.O. Court recognized that students could have legitimate privacy interests in “nondisruptive yet highly personal items such as photographs, letters, and
diaries” that they carry in their “purses or wallets.” Id. at 339.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35
36
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the government or its officials.” 44 More specifically, the First Amendment
sought to protect those who voiced their criticism “of the government or its
officials.”45 However, these protections did not extend to publications of information deemed “improper” or “illegal.”46 For instance, English common law
did not offer protection for various forms of speech classified as sedition.47
This tradition carried over to the United States during its formation and its
adoption of the First Amendment, and also included profanity, blasphemy, and
speech that “had ‘a bad tendency’ to cause crime.”48 As an illustration, “[t]he
protection of free speech would not protect a man [in] falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing panic.”49
The First Amendment has been interpreted “to guard the interests of both the
speaker in disseminating information and the listener in receiving it.”50 It also
prevents the government from prohibiting speech or expressive conduct despite
disapproval of the expressed ideas.51 The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of freedom of expression as it “may contribute to society’s edification.”52 Moreover, the Court has held that the “right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society.”53
This protection has also been extended to public educational institutions in that
school officials cannot have absolute control over these fundamental rights of
students.54 For example, as long as a student’s ideas and expressions do not
substantially or materially interfere with school activities or the rights of others, those ideas and expressions are protected under the First Amendment.55
See Jay, supra note 15, at 783.
Id.
46 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52; see
also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism
of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (2011) (noting that “in colonial-era
American law . . . largely accepted [Blackstone’s] view of the power to punish expression
thought to be harmful.”).
47 Jay, supra note 15, at 783.
48 Id. at 784 (“Every state at the time of the First Amendment was adopted outlawed
either blasphemy or profanity . . . [m]ore generally, speech that had ‘a bad tendency’ to
cause crime, disorders or immoral acts could be punished.”).
49 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
50 Jay, supra note 15, at 1018.
51 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 6.
51 Jay, supra note 15, at 1018 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also First Nat’l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
53 Id. at 1018 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
54 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“Students
in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed
of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State.”).
55 Id. at 513–14.
44
45
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AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN SOCIAL NETWORKS

Social networks are “interactive web sites that connect users based on common interests and that allow subscribers to personalize individual web sites.”56
In more recent years, social networks have become a popular and highly recognized tool for the everyday Internet user.57 These social networks allow individuals to express and interact with one another in a variety of ways, spanning
from “aimless chatter to the exchange of offensive and obscene materials.”58 In
addition, social networks offer ways of “meaningful and important exchanges
among diverse parties.” 59 For instance, continued popularity of these social
media websites has attracted companies to use them to reach consumers.60 Although users of these networks share information with others, they still want to
maintain control over the information that is shared.61 A few of the more popular social networks and their privacy capabilities are discussed below.
A. Twitter
Twitter.com (“Twitter”) is a social network that provides information in real-time relating to ideas, opinions, and news about what the user finds interesting.62 Twitter enables users to find other accounts and follow those conversa-

56 John S. Wilson, Myspace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic
Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2007). There is no clear definition for social networks. Nathan Petrashek, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2010). However, the Western District of
Texas has defined it as a website that “allows its members to create online ‘profiles,’ which
are individual web pages on which members post photographs, videos, and information
about their lives and interests. The idea of online social networking is that members will use
their online profiles to become part of an online community of people with common interests.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845–46 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
57 Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
741, 742, 749 (2008).
58 Id. at 742. “Social networks include web-based sites such as Facebook, Google Buzz,
MySpace, LinkedIn, and Twitter, which allow users to register with the service, create a
profile, view and post content on other users’ pages, send messages, establish and join social
groups, invite members to events, and search for other members using the same network and
connect with those members.” Powell, supra note 14, at 690.
59 Zarsky, supra note 57, at 742.
60 Id. at 749; see also MICHAEL A. STELZNER, 2013 SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING INDUSTRY REPORT: HOW MARKETERS ARE USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO GROW BUSINESS 17 (2013),
available at http://commcns.org/1n6GdaN.
61 Powell, supra note 14, at 692; see also Bob Sullivan, Facebook Users Want More
Privacy, But Are Nudged Towards Less, Study Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1aUG8Hl.
62 About, TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1cLNZpC (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
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tions as well.63 When the user posts a message on Twitter, those bursts of information are called tweets, which are limited to 140 characters.64 However,
users are not limited to just posting ideas and opinions; they may also post
photos and videos directly.65
Twitter’s privacy policy states “that its [s]ervices are primarily designed to
help [users] share information with the world[,] while cautioning its users to
[k]eep in mind that although [they] may consider certain information to be private, not all postings of such information may be a violation of this policy.”66
Although the default setting for a user’s Twitter account is a publicly viewable
setting, the user can change the settings “to make the information more private.”67
B. Facebook
Facebook.com (“Facebook”) is an online social network where “[u]sers
share personal information, pictures, and comments with their friends and followers and post status updates which provide up-to-the-minute details about
their daily activity.”68 Similar to Twitter, this information can be seen by anyone depending on the privacy setting of the user’s Facebook account.69 Moreover, Facebook provides an option allowing “users to choose who can view their
profile, find them in a search, or see their personal information.”70
C. Instagram
Instagram.com (“Instagram”) is a picture-sharing social network,71 allowing
users to alter pictures using different filters prior to sharing those pictures.72 To
share a photo, a user need only take the photo with his or her mobile phone and
then upload it.73
63 Id.;
see also Help Center: Finding People on Twitter, TWITTER,
http://commcns.org/1j4qKux (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
64 TWITTER, supra note 62.
65 Id.; see also Carrie-Ann Skinner, How to Upload Images to Twitter, PC ADVISOR
(June 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/1aUGm17.
66 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93.
67 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1aUGnCk (last visited Aug. 22,
2013).
68 Powell, supra note 20, 163.
69 Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://commcns.org/1cLOjod
(last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
70 Powell, supra note 20, at 165.
71 FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/1cLOlfJ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
72 Marie-Andrée Weiss, Friends with Commercial Benefits: Social Media Users Do Not
Want Their Likeness Used in Advertisements, 16 J. INTERNET L. 1, 8 (2013).
73 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71.
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An Instagram user is also able to control his or her privacy settings.74 When
the user first joins the social network, all the photos are visible “to anyone using Instagram or on the Instagram.com website.”75 However, the user may elect
to make his or her account private.76 When the account is private, the user must
approve all “follow requests” of other individuals that wish to view the user’s
account.77 In addition, this privacy function allows only those people who follow the user on Instagram to see the user’s photos.78 Therefore, when users set
their account settings to private, thereby restricting public access,79 they have
evidenced an expectation that only those individuals allowed to “follow” them
can see the contents of their Instagram account.
IV.

PRIVACY AND EXPRESSION: ISSUES IN THE
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Social media networks often provoke controversy regarding the permissibility of students to share comments and photos on social media pages. 80 The
Courts have already determined that students possess these rights;81 however,
those rights can be limited in schools under certain circumstances.82 However,
74 Id.; see also Larry Magid, Teens and Tweens Flock to Instagram What Parents Need
to Know (Updated), SAFEKIDS.COM, http://commcns.org/1ibcX1N (last updated May 2013).
75 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Magid, supra note 74.
76 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Jam Kotenko, Privacy Advocates Say Instagram
16, 2013),
Is Unsafe for Underage Users, DIGITAL TRENDS (May
http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/keep-our-underage-children-safe-instagramconcerned-parents/.
77 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Kotenko, supra note 76.
78 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see How Do I Set My Photos So That Only Approved
Followers Can See Them?, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/1ilTWdI (last visited Sept. 6,
2013).
79 Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/LpZCHD (last visited Aug. 23,
2013) (“Any information or content that you voluntarily disclose for posting to the Service,
such as User Content, becomes available to the public, as controlled by any applicable privacy settings that you set.”).
80 See, e.g., Alice Park, Are Med-Student Tweets Breaching Patient Privacy?, TIME,
Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://commcns.org/1ejuDK3 (“Younger [medical] students
were more likely than older staff members to believe that their thoughts and opinions were
valid to post online, regardless of their potentially damaging or discriminatory impact on
others.”); Jaime Sarrio & Emily Bazar, Student’s Expulsion Feeds Debate On Online Rights,
USA TODAY (Feb. 3, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://commcns.org/1ilU3Gg (“The expulsion of a
high school basketball player who posted angry messages on Facebook highlights a growing
debate over students’ privacy and free-speech rights online.”); Sarah Mui, Cyberbullying
Law Would Violate Students’ Free Speech, Opponents Say, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1j4rFva (noting the constitutional concerns raised by an Indiana bill that
gives school officials the ability to punish a student for that student’s online comments).
81 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1143–44 (D. Minn. 2012).
82 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“It is evident that the school setting
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the way schools and their social media policies have begun to thwart these
constitutionally protected rights is troubling.83
A. Secondary Schools
As seen in R.S. ex rel. S.S., other public schools have been enforcing similar
social media policies.84 In some cases, school officials learn that a student may
have inappropriate material on a social media site.85 To avoid potential issues
of “bullying and other possible ramifications at school,” school officials would
call that student into their office and force the student to reveal his or her
password; the student suspected of inappropriate material would be instructed
to “log onto the site and show [the school officials] the questionable online
content.”86 If the student fails to cooperate with the school officials’ demand
then he or she might be threatened with further discipline87 or may be pressured
into complying.88
B. Postsecondary Schools
Forced consent policies do not end with primary and secondary schools. In
addition, “forced consent” policies are also enforced by public universities and
are a growing concern.89 Some universities require college students to grant
school officials access to their social media accounts;90 more worrisome are
those universities that force their students to turn over their login information
to such accounts.91
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.”)
83 See Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (discussing how
school officials forced a student to log in to her social media account so they could monitor); see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (observing that many universities require students to allow school officials to access their social media accounts).
84 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; Bob Sullivan, School Officials’ Facebook Rummaging Prompts Mom’s Privacy Crusade, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2012, 6:10 AM),
http://commcns.org/1lvX0Zw.
85 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22.
86 Id.
87 See Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (“When [the student] hesitated and stated that she did not remember her passwords, the officials called her a
liar and threatened her with detention if she did not give them her passwords.”)
88 See Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing how students are told that they could not
leave the school official’s room until they revealed “their passwords or unlock their phones
and allow school officials to browse their personal information”).
89 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22.
90 Id.
91 Alissa Del Riego et al., Your Password Or Your Paycheck?: A Job Applicant’s Murky
Right to Social Media Privacy, 3 J. INTERNET L. 1, 18–19 (2012) (“Recently, there have
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University athletic departments are particularly interested in monitoring
their student-athletes. At some colleges, such as the University of North Carolina, school officials force their student-athletes to consent to the monitoring of
their social network accounts by signing a social media policy.92 The social
media policy at University of North Carolina states: “Each team must identify
at least one coach or administrator who is responsible for having access to and
regularly monitoring the content of team members’ social networking sites and
posting.”93 In addition, it states that “[t]he athletics department also reserves
the right to have other staff members monitor athletes.”94 When dealing with a
social network such as Facebook, this policy requires a student to accept a
friend request of “a coach or compliance officer, giving that person access to
their ‘friends-only’ posts.”95
However, University of North Carolina is not alone in its policies when
dealing with student-athletes. 96 The University of Michigan also requires its
student-athletes to sign a social media policy.97 The policy identifies, for the
student-athlete, what the University deems an appropriate use of social media
accounts, as well as the disciplinary actions that a student will face, should the
student’s account violate the policy.98 The “severity of the discipline will be
based on the seriousness of the infraction,” and range from “[a] conference
with the student-athlete’s coach and/or sport administrator to discuss the infraction,” to the student’s removal from the team.99 Other schools implement
their social media policies in other ways such as banning student-athletes from
using specific words on Twitter, or banning students from using Twitter altogether.100 Some schools use social media monitoring companies for around the

been several reports of employers in the United States requesting [sic] job candidates for
access to their Facebook accounts before making a hiring decision. Denial of this request
can be tantamount to an application withdrawal, forcing candidates to decide between their
privacy and their prospective employment.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 9; Hudson, Jr.,
supra note 7, at 22.
92 Hanner, supra note 23; see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. As noted above, this
practice extends to job applicants. Michelle Singletary, Would You Give Potential Employers Your Facebook Password, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2012), http://commcns.org/1ilUnov.
93 Sullivan, supra note 9.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Pete Thamel, Tracking Twitter, Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at D1,
D5 (noting that other universities, like Oklahoma and Nebraska, also monitor their athletes’
online profiles).
97 University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS (Oct.
9, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1nGthvo (“Student-athletes are required to notify
the Athletics Department of any social media accounts they maintain.”).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Woodhouse, supra note 9.
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clock surveillance.101
These practices are becoming more common in today’s society generally,102
as even some employers utilize forced consent policies. For instance, some
employers request that job seekers log in to their social media accounts during
interviews and allow an interviewer to view their content while the applicant
“clicks through wall posts, friends, photos and anything else that might be
found behind the privacy wall.”103 Though these practices may be seen as voluntary, college applicants, similar to job seekers, only agree to these requests
in hopes of a favorable outcome.104 Just as a job seeker hopes to be employed, a
college applicant similarly hopes to be accepted.105
V.

MODERN VIEWS ON PRIVACY RIGHTS OF SOCIAL
MEDIA USAGE IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Social media policies that force students to disclose social network account
information have their share of proponents and critics. Each side has concluded
that its stance and concerns on the issue should be given more weight than the
other.106
A. Supporters of “Forced Consent” Policies
Although “forced consent” are unfavorable among students and their parents,107 these policies still have strong advocates.108 In secondary education in101 Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Being Social: Why the NCAA Has Forced Universities to
Monitor Student-Athletes’ Social Media, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 39-40 (2013);
see also Woodhouse, supra note 9; Catherine Ho, Companies Tracking College Athletes’
Tweets, Facebook Posts Go after Local Universities, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A16;
see also Sullivan, supra note 9 (“Schools are also turning to social media monitoring companies with names like UDilligence and Varsity Monitor for software packages that automate the task. The programs offer a ‘reputation scoreboard’ to coaches and send ‘threat
level’ warnings about individual athletes to compliance officers.”).
102 Joanna Stern, Demanding Facebook Passwords May Break Law, Say Senators, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://commcns.org/MpDjma.
103 Sullivan, supra note 9.
104 Id. (“While submitting to a Facebook review is voluntary, virtually all applicants
agree to it out of a desire to score well in the interview.”).
105 See Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18-19 (discussing how employers “ask or obtain
access” to a candidate’s social media account). “Denial of this request can be tantamount to
an application withdrawal, forcing candidates to decide between their privacy and their prospective employment.” Id.
106 Sullivan, supra note 9.
107 Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing a mother’s disapproval and the effect of school
conduct on her daughter).
108 See Press Release, Kaplan Test Prep, Kaplan Test Prep Survey Finds That College
Admissions Officers’ Discovery of Online Material Damaging to Applicants Nearly Triples
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stitutions, school officials argue that forcing students to provide them with
their social network account information furthers a legitimate interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom.109 Administrators argue that schools should
monitor what students are doing at any point in time.110 Other concerns include
bullying,111 cyber-bullying,112 and drug trafficking.113 Supporters also argue that
in some cases, students volunteer to allow school officials to see the content of
the students’ social media accounts before the school official has even asked.114
School officials in postsecondary schools have concerns similar to employers who request applicants to allow them access to social media account profiles.115 Employers argue that they have a legitimate interest in obtaining as
much information on the applicant as possible.116 In their view, a job applicant’s poor reputation or questionable behavior may have a negative impact on
the employer’s reputation.117 Employers use the applicant’s social media account profile to provide a picture of the applicant’s personality and character.118
Just as employers take special interest in gaining insight into the character of
an applicant “to assess whether contracting the applicant would be in the organization’s best interest,”119 so do universities in deciding whether to accept a
college applicant.120
Supporters of “forced consent” in colleges rationalize the policy of monitoring the social media accounts of student-athletes with the ruling in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton.121 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a school
district’s policy requiring student-athletes to be subjected to drug testing in
in a Year (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1ibex3A (noting that in the field of
college admissions, “the traditional application – the essays, the letters of recommendation –
represent the polished version of an applicant, while often what’s found online is a rawer
version of that applicant,” and discussing findings of essay plagiarism, vulgarities in blogs,
alcohol consumption, and ‘illegal activities.’”)
109 See R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1143 (D. Minn. 2012).
110 Hanner, supra note 23.
111 Jamie P. Hopkins et al., supra note 105, at 30.
112 See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 622 (citing an example definition of “bullying”
to include actions taken by electronic means from LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
416.13(C)(2) (2010) (West, Westlaw through 2012), amended by LA. REV. STAT. tit. 17, §
416.13(C)(1)(b) (2012)).
113 Sullivan, supra note 84.
114 Id.
115 Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Kaplan Test Prep, supra note 108.
121 Hanner, supra note 23; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995).
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order to participate in school sports. 122 Under Vernonia, supporters of these
social media policies argue, “students are not obligated to join a college sports
team and as such, can be asked to forfeit certain rights for the ‘privilege’ of
playing.” 123 Additionally, universities argue that online monitoring practices
ensure student-athletes “are not excessively trash-talking other teams or committing crimes that could reflect poorly on the institution.”124
B. Opponents of “Forced Consent” Policies
Critics of these policies do not share the same understanding as the school
officials that endorse them.125 They argue that these administrative practices, in
both secondary and postsecondary schools, requiring students to allow school
officials to access or monitor their social media accounts violate the students’
right to privacy.126 Simply put, they view these policies as a way of spying on
students.127 Opponents further argue that “forced consent” policies constitute an
unreasonable search and therefore violate the students’ freedom of expression
under the First and Fourth Amendments.128 Although a student may voluntarily
allow a school official to view his/her social media accounts in some circumstances, in other cases, the student is under duress from fear of disciplinary
actions.129
Regarding student-athletes in postsecondary schools, critics do not agree
with the view that these social media policies should be treated similarly to
drug testing, which the court has upheld in school athletics.130 For instance,
Bradley Shear, an attorney and adjunct professor at The George Washington
University, makes a distinction between the two policies. 131 Shear contends
“[t]he difference between drug testing cases and [social media policies] is that
in drug testing, a school is looking at illegal substances.”132 However, “[h]ere
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
Hanner, supra note 23.
124 Id.
125 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (noting lawmakers have introduced legislation to
protect students’ First and Fourth Amendment rights).
126 Hanner, supra note 23.
127 Sullivan, supra note 9 (arguing that “schools are in the business of educating, not
spying”).
128 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1133 (D. Minn. 2012) (plaintiffs in this action alleged violations of First and Fourth
Amendment rights); U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129 See Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing how students are told that they cannot leave
the school officials’ room until they have revealed their passwords or unlocked their phones
for inspection).
130 Hanner, supra note 23.
131 Id.
132 Id.
122
123
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you’re looking at inappropriate conduct. It’s comparing apples to oranges.”133
Furthermore, there are concerns that if public universities have a right to access
student-athletes private social media account posts, “then what will stop [public universities] from claiming a right to access and monitor private email accounts, voicemail messages, etc . . . and installing eavesdropping equipment
into off-campus apartments?”134
VI.

POLICIES THAT FORCE STUDENTS TO CONSENT TO
MONITORING OF THEIR STUDENT MEDIA ACCOUNTS
ARE FLAWED

Despite the possible good intentions of practitioners of “forced consent” policies, these policies violate the First and Fourth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.135 Moreover, students have a protected interest in the contents of their social media accounts.
A. Violation of Students’ Privacy Rights
The social media policies that make students consent to the access or monitoring of their social media accounts constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and are, therefore, unconstitutional.136 A
search under the Fourth Amendment is a governmental intrusion into a constitutionally protected area where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with the intent to obtain information.137 In public schools, school officials are
agents of the State.138 Thus, when public school officials demand a student to
reveal his or her login information for their private social media accounts to
allow school officials to access, monitor, and obtain information, those officials are conducting a search.139
133

Id.
Bradley Shear, UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA’S STUDENT-ATHLETE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://commcns.org/1ibeFA6.
135 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (noting a person’s right to freedom of expression); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (noting a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches).
136 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1142 (D. Minn. 2012).
137 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (quoting United States v. Knotts
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)).
138 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969) (holding that school officials act as representatives
of the State when carrying out searches).
139 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (holding that because the action of the government do not
consist of a physical trespass, the Jones analysis would not apply and the Katz test would be
controlling); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Nevertheless, Justice
134
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees students a right to be free from unreasonable searches.140 In other words, a search without a justifiable and legitimate
government interest violates the Fourth Amendment.141 In determining whether
a search is reasonable, the court must consider whether the person had a subjective expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation is one that society
has recognized as reasonable.142 Therefore, in regard to social media content, it
must be determined that the user has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
that the “expectation of privacy (or control by users of information freely disclosed) on social network sites” is one that “society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.” 143 However, the Katz Court made clear that “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”144
Thus, not only must the student have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of their social media accounts, but they must also show that they
sought to preserve such content as private.145
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court established that consent to
an involuntary search constitutes an unreasonable search.146 In Schneckloth, the
court held that to justify a search on the basis of consent, the Fourth Amendment requires that the consent be voluntarily given.147 “Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.”148 Moreover, the court ruled that consent is not voluntary when it is “not the result of
duress or coercion, express or implied.”149
When school officials in secondary schools bring students down to their ofSotomayor opines: “[we] should not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.”).
140 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
141 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1142 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
142 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
143 Powell, supra note 14, at 700; Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18-19 (“The Applicant
must claim both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy that society recognizes in
[his or her] social media profile and its contents in order to maintain a claim against the
prospective employer who surreptitiously or forcefully accessed her profile.”).
144 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citing Rios v
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 260 (1960)).
145 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Powell, supra note 14, at 699-700 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1989)).
146 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220-28 (1973) (“The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force.”).
147 Id. at 248.
148 Id. at 248-49.
149 Id. at 249.
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fice and demand that the students log in to their social media accounts, it is
sometimes done under the threat of disciplinary action.150 The same can be considered for college applicants and student-athletes.151 If the student applicant or
student-athlete fails to disclose their social network credentials, the school may
penalize them by not accepting the student’s application152 or not allowing the
student to play on the team.153 In these circumstances, the student’s fear of disciplinary actions is what controls the consent; the consent is not voluntarily
given.154
Commentators have disputed whether users of social media networks and
accounts have an expectation of privacy in the contents of their accounts.155 As
discussed previously,156 the default setting for most social media accounts is set
to public—meaning that when information is posted on the social media site,
that information can be viewed by any other person who uses the same social
media site.157 However, many of these social media networks also have privacy
settings where the user can control what information is disclosed to the public
and which people can view the user’s account information.158 In those cases,
150 See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1142 (D. Minn. 2012); see also, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 84.
151 See University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, supra note 101 (discussing disciplinary action taken against a student-athlete if found to be in violation of the University of Michigan’s social media policy).
152 See Riego et al., supra note 91, at 19 (discussing how denying the interviewers request for access to the applicant’s social media account could lead to the withdrawal of an
application).
153 See University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, supra note 101 (“In the
event that a student-athlete’s social media account is found to be in violation of the policy…the athletics department reserves the right to impose discipline which may include one
or more of the following:…[r]emoving the student-athlete from the team.”).
154 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (noting that consent is involuntary if the person has been coerced into giving the consent).
155 Powell, supra note 20, at 175-78 (“One view is that privacy requires an attempt to
maintain secrecy of the information,—once information is revealed to others, it is no longer
private.”). Under the network theory, a person may disclose information on his or her social
media profile so long as there are parameters in place that limit the information that is
shared. Id. at 177. Moreover, “a user maintains a privacy interest, even when personal information is disclosed on a network of users.” Id. at 178.
156 See discussion supra Part III.
157 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93 (citations omitted) (discussing how Twitter’s services were designed to share information with the world); Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last visited
Feb. 17, 2013) (discussing the public view default setting of Facebook); FAQ, INSTAGRAM,
http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (discussing the public view default setting of Instagram). See also Part III of this Comment discussing the privacy settings
of Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
158 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93 (citations omitted) (discussing the privacy settings
for Twitter); Powell, supra note 20, at 165 (discussing the privacy settings for Facebook);
FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (discussing the privacy settings for Insta-
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the user has intended to preserve the contents of their social media accounts as
private.159
Not only do people have an expectation of privacy in the use of social media
accounts, it is an expectation that society has recognized as reasonable.160 Although the public can view the information placed on social media accounts,
“information should be deemed private if the information stays confined to the
initial group to which it was disclosed, even if such a group is rather large.”161
Because users are capable of managing their privacy settings to limit who sees
their information, the “use of controls provided by social network sites sets a
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit limited, for their users.”162
B. Additional Privacy Rights Violation: How “Forced Consent” Policies
Fit Within the Special Needs Doctrine
Although school officials have otherwise asserted,163 schools do not have a
legitimate interest in searching students’ social media accounts. In dealing with
privacy interests of employees, the Supreme Court has held that “public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interest of employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes . . . should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness under all circumstances.”164 This “standard of reasonableness” has also been applied to public schools.165
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court recognized that the school setting “requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to
justify a search.”166 In doing so, the Court held that the warrant and probable

gram).

159 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). When users set their social media
accounts to private, only the persons authorized by the user to view their profiles are able to
view the profile contents. See Powell, supra note 20, at 165 (discussing the privacy capabilities of Facebook).
160 Because the contents of a person’s social media account reveals the personal characteristics and lifestyle of the user, “[i]t is unlikely that a prospective employer’s generalized
search of a job candidate’s [social media] profile to learn more about his personal characteristics and lifestyle would be deemed reasonable, given the search’s breadth in scope and
tangential relation to the [school environment] in most circumstances.” See Riego et al.,
supra note 91, at 19.
161 Powell, supra note 14, at 704 (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevits, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 988 (2005)).
162 Id. at 704.
163 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (discussing the need for teachers
and administrators to maintain discipline in the classroom and on school grounds).
164 Riego et al., supra note 91, at 19 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26
(1987)).
165 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
166 Id. at 340.
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cause requirements do not apply to searches by public school officials.167 In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White explained the warrant requirement is “unsuited to the school environment,” and requiring public school
officials “to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools.”168 Instead, the Court adopted the “special needs” doctrine.169 Specifically, the Court has applied this doctrine in situations “[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and public interests suggest that the public interest is
best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short
of probable cause.”170
Determining the reasonableness of these types of searches requires a twofold
inquiry: “whether the… action was justified at its inception,” and “whether the
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”171 Applying this test
to searches conducted by public school officials, the first prong is satisfied
“when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules
of the school.”172 The second prong, as the Court has ruled, is satisfied if, once
initiated, the search is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.”173
Forced consent policies employed by public school officials in secondary
and postsecondary schools do not meet this test. Even though sometimes public school officials may suspect that viewing or monitoring a student’s social
media content would turn up some evidence of wrongdoing, 174 the way the
school officials go about obtaining this information is not justified and is ex167 See id. (citation omitted) (“The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is
that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although ‘both the concept of probable cause
and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,…in certain limited
circumstances neither is required.’”).
168 Id.
169 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (White, J., concurring) (“The special need for an immediate
response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the
educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant
and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the
relevant interests.”).
170 Id. at 341.
171 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
172 Id. at 342.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., id. (discussing reasonable suspicion that the search will show evidence of a
violation of the law or the rules of the school); see also id. (discussing how the monitoring
of student-athletes helps ensure that the student-athletes are not saying or doing anything
that could reflect poorly on the institution).
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cessively intrusive.175 In secondary institutions, when students are forced by a
school official to login to their social media account in the presence of the
school official and allow them to view its contents, what they are at most seeking to find is in no way interfering with the school environment and its ability
to maintain order. 176 School officials, in these situations, are intruding upon
what a student has deemed private in the sense that a student has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of their social media accounts.177 In addition, the coercive nature of the school officials conduct, in making a student
come down to an office or be threatened with disciplinary actions if he or she
does not cooperate, is unreasonable, since the students’ cooperation is done
unwillingly and involuntarily.178
In postsecondary schools, “forced consent” policies fail the reasonableness
test in a different way. In those instances, the level of intrusion is excessive in
light of the students’ age.179 When in college, a student has typically reached
the age of majority and their expectation of privacy is fundamentally recognized.180 Unreasonable searches for college students are also not justified.181 By
requesting a college applicant for his or her login information, the school administrators cannot reasonably suspect that the search will turn up evidence
that the candidate “has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.”182 This is due to the fact that since these individuals are only applicants, the school has no reason to know whether the prospective student engaged in some wrongdoing.183 A similar argument can be made for studentathletes.184 Unless the student has given an administrator reasonable grounds
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
Id. at 339 (noting the substantial interest of public school officials in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds). Here, the contents of the students’ social
media accounts are located on the internet and in no way interfere in maintaining order.
Moreover, since the content is placed on the students’ social media account outside of
school hours, schools have a far lesser claim to regulating this conduct. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v.
Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting
that out-of-school speech is subject to less stringent school regulation).
177 Powell, supra note 14, at 704.
178 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
179 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
180 Id. at 337-38 (“A search of a child’s person or of a…bag carried on her person, no
less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”).
181 Id. at 342.
182 Id. Under these circumstances, college applicants are being subjected to these illegal
searches based on conduct that the school administrators have no reasonable grounds for
suspecting have even occurred.
183 Id.
184 A student-athlete gives school officials no more reason to suspect wrongdoing than
any other student. Also, the Supreme Court pointed out that students “on the playing field,
or on the campus . . . may express [their] opinions” so long as [they] do[] not “‘materially
175
176
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for suspecting that the monitoring of their social media account will turn up
incriminating evidence prior to the monitoring, then the monitoring should not
be permissible. In this case, anything less than reasonable grounds for suspicion would simply be conjecture.185
C. Violation of Students’ First Amendment Right to Free Expression
In addition to violating the Fourth Amendment, “forced consent” policies infringe upon students’ right of free expression under the First Amendment. It
has long been recognized since the Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., that students’ First Amendment rights are not
waived when they enter the school.186 Moreover, in Tinker the Court noted that:
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves
must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.187

Although it is true that the rights of students in public schools “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”188 students
indeed have a constitutional right of freedom of expression that “must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”189
In Tinker, the Court was ruling on the conduct of a school for punishing stuand substantially interfer[e] . . . with the . . . operation of the school’” or “collid[e] with the
rights of others.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Moreover, speculation without reasonable suspicion is a constitutionally insufficient reason to search a student’s social media posts. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797,
804 (1971)).
185 A school administrator cannot go on a fishing expedition. In order to monitor a student’s social media posts, the administrator needs more than mere speculation that the
search will turn up evidence of wrongdoing. A search must be “justified at its inception” and
actually conducted in a way “reasonably related in scope to [that reason].” T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 346 (quoting Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). “Justified at its inception” requires
that there be “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Id. at 34142 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
186 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (1969; Minnewaska, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (citing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (“For more than forty years,
the United States courts have recognized that students do not check their First Amendment
rights at the schoolhouse door.”).
187 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
188 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
189 Id. at 397 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
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dents for wearing black armbands that symbolized their disdain for the Vietnam War.190 The Court concluded that a school district could not punish the
students for wearing the armbands because they did not “materially and substantially interfere with [the work and discipline of the school].” 191 Furthermore, “[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” and students—in and out of school—have a fundamental right to
freedom of expression of their views.192
Similar to the facts in Tinker, school officials, through their “forced consent” policies, intend to monitor the students’ social media accounts and then
penalize them if they refuse to comply or if they find inappropriate content.193
Generally the content that students post on social networks does not substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,194 and if school officials
have no reason to believe otherwise, there is no legitimate interest in monitoring these activities.195 School officials also lack a legitimate interest when the
student is only an applicant and does not maintain any legal ties to the
school.196 In these circumstances, school officials have no just cause to believe
that the applicant has violated school policy in any way or has made threats of
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
192 Id. at 511 (“Students are ‘persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect.”); see also R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch.
Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 405 (2007)) (“Out-of-school speech by a student is subject to even less stringent
school regulation than in-school speech.”).
193 For example, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F.
Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (D. Minn. 2012), a school official threatened a student with disciplinary action if she refused to comply with the official’s demand to view the content of her
social media account. Id. The University of Michigan requires its student-athletes to sign a
social media policy agreement and disciplines violations. Woodhouse, supra note 9. Some
colleges go much further than Michigan by forcing athletes to allow school officials access
to their private accounts (such as Utah State University), banning players from using a long
list of words on Twitter (such as University of Kentucky), or forbidding the student from
using Twitter altogether. Id.
194 Student speech on the Internet is regulated under the same “clearly established general principles which have governed schools for decades.” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No.
2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. Student speech is constitutionally protected expression—
popular viewpoint or not—unless it would “materially and substantially interfere with the . .
. operation of the school.” See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
195 School officials cannot peruse a student’s posts without “reason to believe that [they
would find] evidence of illegal behavior or violations of school policy.” Minnewaska Area
Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
337, 339, 342 (1985)).
196 For an analogous argument in the employment context, see, e.g., Riego et al., supra
note 91 (discussing the distinction between investigating potential misconduct in the workplace and searching merely to learn more about the personal characteristics and lifestyle of a
job applicant).
190
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physical violence, for which the First Amendment would offer no protection.197
The same should be said for students in secondary schools and studentathletes.198 Therefore, penalizing the student for not disclosing their social media account information violates the students’ right to free expression under the
First Amendment.199
VII.

HOW STUDENTS’ RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND FREE
EXPRESSION CAN BE UPHELD

Because these “forced consent” policies are an issue in our educational system, counteractive solutions should exist in order to prevent these problems
from reoccurring. Three possible solutions that would help battle against these
social media policies are discussed below.
A. Legislative Enactments Prohibiting the Monitoring of Students Social
Media Accounts
One solution that would remedy these forms of social media policies is for
state legislators to enact statutes that expressly prohibit this conduct. On July
20, 2012, the Delaware state legislature passed the Education Privacy Act,
“[prohibiting] university officials from forcing students to disclose digitally
protected information.”200 Specifically, this law addresses privacy concerns of
students and offers protections for both “students and applicants” at post-

Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
Whether a student “on the campus” or an athlete “on the playing field,” he is free to
express his opinion so long as he does not “‘materially and substantially interfer[e] . . . with
the . . . operation of the school’” or “collid[e] with the rights of others.” Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars,
363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). “[S]chool officials may not simply ‘reach out to discover, monitor, or punish any type of out of school speech.’” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No.
2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011)).
199 “[S]tudents are ‘persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamental rights .
. . [and] may not be confined to [officially approved] expression[s].” Tinker, 393 U.S. at
511. Furthermore, all out-of-school statements “are protected under the First Amendment
and not punishable by school authorities unless they are true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or
other substantial disruption in that environment.” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149,
894 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (emphasis in original). Punishing students for not disclosing their
social media account information without reasonable suspicion they have violated a law or
school rule is akin to “school officials . . . ‘reach[ing] out to discover, monitor, [and] punish
any type of out of school speech.’” Id. at 1139.
200 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2012).
197
198
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secondary educational institutions throughout the State. 201 The necessity for
this protection stems from the “current trend” for Americans to engage in these
forms of online communication.202
Delaware legislators have recognized that 75% of adults, ages eighteen to
twenty-four, and 56% of adults, between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four,
have a social media account.203 In addition, the state legislature recognized that
young Americans use these various social media accounts for personal use in
“maintaining community contacts and content sharing [which] are currently
more prevalent than professional uses.”204 Also, Delaware legislators recognize
the tendency for youth to use social networks “as a primary vehicle for effecting positive social and political change . . . establish[ing] social networks as
the new digital age ‘public square’ for important discourse.”205 Moreover, a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their social
media accounts.206 Other states have enacted similar legislation to protect the
privacy rights of students.207 However, thus far, only Michigan has taken into
consideration the privacy rights of students in secondary schools.208
Another solution would be for federal legislators to enact a statute to protect
the privacy rights of students. Congressman Eliot Engel, Congresswoman Jan
Schakowsky, and Congressman Michael Grim have taken initial steps to
achieve such a federal privacy statute.209 These members of congress have introduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act, (“SNOPA”), that
would protect users of social networking who are “employed or enrolled, and
those seeking employment or admittance, or those facing disciplinary action,
from being required to give passwords or other information used to access their
[social media] accounts.”210 In Congressman Engel’s view, it is erroneous to
justify the conduct of institutions that demand private social media account
H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012).
Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. (alteration in original).
205 Id.
206 Id.; Salem, supra note 27.
207 Salem, supra note 27 (“[S]ix states [have enacted or] will enact the social media privacy acts.”).
208 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.271-.2075, at 37.272(b) (2012) (“‘Educational institution’ . . . includes . . . secondary school . . . [and] shall be construed broadly to include public and private institutions of higher education to the greatest extent consistent with constitutional limitations.”).
209 See Reps. Engel, Schakowsky, Grimm Seek to Protect Online Content (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1fnw2vC.
210 See id. (alteration in original) (“The bill would prohibit current or potential employers
or education institutions from requiring a username, password or other access to online content, or disciplining, discriminating, or denying employment to individuals, or punish them
for refusing to volunteer such information.”).
201
202
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information because the information was placed online.211 Besides, when laws
are silent in “prohibiting institutions from requiring this information, it becomes a common practice.”212
B. Proposed Model Statute for Education Privacy Laws
As a means of protecting students in both secondary and postsecondary educational institutions, this Comment proposes that state legislators either enact
or amend their statutes, similar to the Delaware statute,213 to prohibit public and
private educational institutions,214 “and their employees and representatives,”
from requiring or requesting from “a student, prospective student, or student
group to disclose their personal social media information.”215 The statutes will
also prohibit an academic institution from penalizing or refusing to admit an
applicant as a result of the student or applicant’s refusal to disclose their social
media information.216
Any new statutes should also extend privacy rights to students in secondary
schools because high school students are the primary users of these social media networks.217 Currently, the Delaware statute defines “Academic institution”
as a “public or nonpublic institution of higher education or institution of postsecondary education.”218 However, this does not take into account that there is
a large population of children ages 11 to 18 that also use social media sites to
interact with friends and family.219 By doing so, this will avoid vagueness and
place institutions on notice that similar conduct is also prohibited. Further211

See id.
See id.
213 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8102-104 (2012).
214 Because private institutions are not state actors, they are typically not subject to
claims regarding unconstitutional restrictions on students’ free speech. Jamie P. Hopkins et
al. supra note 105, at 32.
215 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121 (2012); see DEL. CODE ANN. § 8103 (2012); Molly
DiBianca, NJ Passes Password-Protection Law for Employees and Students, DELAWARE
EMPLOYMENT LOG BLOG (Oct. 30, 2012), http://commcns.org/1blNj9b. As of February 16,
2013, there are only four states that prohibit school officials in postsecondary institutions
from requiring students to disclose any social media account information. See Christina
Farr, Michigan Passes Internet Privacy Act to Protect Students and Employees, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 30, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://commcns.org/MQ2ZJp; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE §
99121 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. § 8103 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.271.275 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-30-18A:3-31 (2012).
216 See DEL. CODE ANN. § 8104 (2012).
217 However, in Delaware, the provision that protected students in secondary institutions
was removed from the Higher Education Privacy Act over concerns that it would protect
bullies. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22.
218 DEL. CODE ANN. § 8102 (2012).
219 Lauren Fisher, SIMPLY ZESTY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://commcns.org/1kBBjDl (86% of
children use social media to build their personal brand.).
212
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more, by enacting these new statutes, it will prohibit school officials from asserting qualified immunity to avoid liability for this conduct.220
C. Ruling from the Judicial System
The District Courts are split in deciding whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their use of social media accounts.221 In United States
v. Meregildo, the district court noted that “[w]hen a social media user disseminates his postings and information to the public, they are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.” 222 However, the Meregildo court also recognized that
when a person uses a more secure privacy setting, it shows “the user’s intent to
preserve information as private” and may be protected under the Fourth
Amendment.223
In R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, the district court
also held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
social media content.224 In this case, the court dealt with a school official’s demands for access to a student’s social media accounts to show inappropriate
conduct.225 Furthermore, the court found that the school official’s conduct violated the student’s right to privacy. 226 In addition, the court found that the
school official’s conduct violated the student’s right to free expression because
the school officials sought to penalize the student for the content of her social
media account.227
Without a statute enacted by a state or the federal legislature, the only way
to prohibit the conduct of school officials in secondary and postsecondary institutions from requesting the social media account information from its students is for the United States Supreme Court to make a ruling on the constituHudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
222 United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (2012) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In this case, the Government learned that the defendant
posted messages on Facebook regarding prior acts of violence, threatened new violence to
rival gang members, and sought allegiance from his fellow gang members. Id. at 526. Law
enforcement officers accessed the defendant’s profile through a person who was a “friend”
to the defendant’s profile page. Id.
223 Id. at 525 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)). The district
court also determined that the Government does not violate the Fourth Amendment when
the Government accesses the content through a cooperating witness who is a “friend.” Id. at
526.
224 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1142 (D. Minn. 2012).
225 Id. at 1134.
226 Id. at 1142.
227 Id. at 1138-39.
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tionality of these “forced consent” policies.228
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Incidents like the one in Minnesota involving a twelve-year-old student have
begun to arouse interest throughout the United States.229 As a result of this new
found attention, state legislatures have begun to enact new laws that prohibit
these “forced consent” policies from taking place in educational institutions
and to protect the rights of students to be free from this governmental intrusion
into their daily lives.230 Although there has been a small movement of states to
ensure the privacy protections of students,231 more states need to take action
and pass legislation on their own accord. More importantly, these states need
to expand upon the scope of these protections to include students from both
secondary and postsecondary schools, private and public.232
It is critical to have uniform legislation prohibiting these forced consent policies because it will prevent situations where students are made to choose between cooperation and embarrassment,233 or between cooperation and penalization.234 It is not fair to subject young adults, let alone children, to restrictions
and violations of their fundamental right to free expression,235 or their right to
privacy.236 If these proposed amendments and enactments had been in place in
Minnesota, then that twelve-year-old girl would not have suffered embarrassment and violations of her right to privacy.

228 Because there has only been one case in the United States district courts reviewing
the constitutionality of conduct by school officials that demand the social media account
information from its students under the threat of potential disciplinary action, the Supreme
Court should determine whether these acts violate the student’s First and Fourth Amendment rights.
229 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1139 (D. Minn. 2012).
230 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121 (2012); DiBianca, supra note 215.
231 See Farr, supra note 215.
232 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (discussing how Delaware legislators plan to reintroduce a provision of its Higher Education Privacy Act that protects students in secondary
schools).
233 Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (D. Minn. 2012)
(discussing how the student cried and felt depressed after returning home from school after
being forced to give up social media account login information).
234 Id. at 1134 (discussing how school officials made threats that if the student did not
allow them to search through her Facebook then she would be punished).
235 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
236 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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APPENDIX I
Proposed Amendment to West’s Delaware Code Annotated § 8102 Definitions
(a) “Academic institution” means public or nonpublic academic institution,
and includes an institution of secondary education and an institution of
higher education or institution of postsecondary education.
(b) “Applicant” means a prospective student applying for admission into the
subject academic institution.
(c) “Electronic communication device” means a cell telephone, personal digital assistant, electronic device with mobile data access, laptop computer,
pager, broadband personal communication device whether mobile or desktop, 2-way messaging device, electronic game, or portable computing device.
(d) “Social networking site” means an Internet-based, personalized, privacyprotected website or application whether free or commercial that allows users to construct a private or semi-private profile site within a bounded system, create a list of other system users who are granted reciprocal access to
the individual’s profile site, send and receive email, and share personal content, communications, and contacts.
(e) “Student” means a person whom, at all relevant times, is admitted into
the academic institution.

